

MODULE 4: ENSURING THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Preparatory Notes to Instructors

AIM

To familiarize peacekeeping personnel with:

- The importance of operational level planning
- Protection of civilian issues through the development of a coherent operational level plan

AUDIENCE

This module was designed for an operational level audience who has solid knowledge on the field mission organization and functioning, and how it interacts with mission partners on the ground. For a tactical level audience (for example, Contingent and Battalion Commanders and Battalion staff), this subject is also highly relevant; however, learning outcomes and content should be suited to the trainees` profile.

Specific Participant Profile:

- Military - Battalion level and above
- Police – FPU Commanders and above
- Civilian – Heads of Substantive Sections and above

LEARNING OUTCOMES

On completion of Module 4, participants will be able to:

1. Understand the importance of mission-wide operational planning for POC as well as the range of challenges and actors involved
2. Describe the range of protection threats and civilian vulnerabilities that need to be

- considered, and how different types of threat/vulnerability impact the response
3. Explain the importance and modalities of operational level information sharing, and public information efforts

TRAINING SEQUENCE

Modules 1-4 are to be delivered in sequence, followed by the Scenario based exercises.

DURATION

Part 1	Lecture/Presentation	Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment
	35 min.	10 min.
Part 2	Lecture/Presentation	Questions/Discussion & Session Assessment
	35 min.	10 min
Part 3	Small groups discussion	Plenary presentation / discussion
	30 min.	15 min.

METHODOLOGY

- The following points outline a suggested methodology. Experienced instructors may choose to use alternative methods and activities to present the material and key messages in this unit.
- Training is divided into 45 minute blocks with 10 minute break periods between each block.
- This module will include lecture issues followed by group questions/discussion and learning activities as appropriate.

Part 1:

- Presentations using the provided PowerPoint slides
- Informal question and answer periods (as determined by instructor)

Part 2:

- Small group discussion and solution to the requirements of Activity 4.1

Part 3:

- Short presentations to be made by the small groups, followed by plenary discussion on the questions proposed by Activity 4.1

INSTRUCTOR PROFILE

Module 4 is best presented by an instructor who has personal experience in a peacekeeping operation with a Protection of Civilian (POC) mandate, with a solid understanding of the operational concept of POC and how it's implemented in the mission(s). The Instructor should have undergone a formal training course on POC at national or international level.

INSTRUCTOR PREPARATIONS

Required Readings:

- Charter of the United Nations
- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (also known as the Capstone Doctrine)
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges (2009)
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations

- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians
- DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective Into the Work of the United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Mainstreaming the Protection, Rights and Well-being of Children Affected by Armed Conflict within UN Peacekeeping Operations
- Analytical and Conceptual Framing of Conflict Related Sexual Violence (UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict)
- Secretary General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of International Humanitarian Law
- Carana Case Study and Scenario materials
 - Carana Training Pack
 - Country Study Overview
 - Scenarios

Equipment:

- Computer and provided session slides.
- Projector and screen for slides.

Materials:

- Copies of the *Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (one per participant). For copies, please download the electronic file at:
<http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/Public/Home.aspx>
- Selected Carana Mission Materials – Mandate, Rules of Engagement, and Concept of Operations (Students should be provided with copies of these well in advance of POC training).

PARTICIPANT PREPARATIONS

All participants must have a strong familiarity with the following:

- POC Pre-Deployment Training: Participant Handbook.
- Carana Case Study Materials provided;
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations;
- DPKO/DFS (Draft) Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Security Council Resolutions (please download from <http://www.un.org/en/documents/>):











- Concerning Children and Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1612), 2005.
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1674), 2006.
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, (S/RES/1894), 2009.
- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1325), 2000.
- Women and Peace and Security, (S/RES/1960), 2010.

MATERIALS REFERENCED IN THIS MODULE

- DPKO/DFS Draft Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilians (POC) strategies in UN Peacekeeping *Operations* (2010)
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2009)
- DRAFT Explanatory Note on Protection of Civilians Language in Security Council Mandates for Peacekeeping Missions


- Henry L Stimson Center, Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Washington, D.C, (2011)
- Integrated Mission Planning Process Guidelines: Role of the Field; Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences
- Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008)
- OCHA Aide Memoire for the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians
- OCHA/DPKO Study on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations (2009)
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping

SYMBOLS LEGEND


	Note to the Instructor (Some background information for consideration and mention)
	Speaking Points (The main points to cover on the topic. Ideally the speaking points are presented in the instructor's own words versus being read to participants. Please note, text in the slides is highlighted in bold, blue fonts in the associated speaking points.)
	Mission Specific (A point where the session will benefit from mission specific information)
	Example (Stories that illustrate a point or key message)
	Sample questions (A list of potential questions to pose to participants)
	Handout (Indicates a handout is provided to participants at this point)
	Film (A film that is suggested as either a core or optional activity)
	Core Learning Activity (An activity that is strongly recommended for inclusion)
	Optional Learning Activity (An activity that can be used if there is time and it is appropriate for the participant group. Guidelines for these activities are provided at the end of the unit or part – as indicated in the text)
	Key summary points (Key messages that are worth repeating at the end of the session. Alternatively, the instructor can ask participants what are the main messages they are taking from the session. Instructors can then fill in any points that have been missed.)

Session Notes

1. INTRODUCTION




Slide 1



Slide 2

🗨 The UN




Slide 3

peacekeeping operations are comprised of a broad range of actors which need to be understood in terms of their specific mandate, possibilities, constraints and goals. Operational planning is the tool used at mission level which permits the organization of available resources within the mission and the coordination of those existing out of the mission in a coherent plan to address strategic objectives like protection of civilians. Therefore you must understand the importance of operational level planning and how it is built with the participation of relevant actors, as the UNCT.

🗨 Module 4 is focused mainly on explaining how a strategic level decision to protect civilians is translated at the operational level in order to be implemented by the field mission. This module will explain what are the main factors analyzed in the process of planning at operational level and how they affect the type of protection response.


2. THE IMPORTANCE OF OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING



Slide 5

- 🗨️ Slide 6 shows the multitude of UN bodies that are part of UN peacekeeping operations as well as and the non UN actors present in the mission operational environment, and how they are connected.
- 🗨️ **A coherent protection response requires a sound plan which involves consultation and coordination with all protection actors (UN and non UN) in order to organize all available protection resources to address protection threats in a proactive, logical way.**
- 👉 **Note to Instructor:** Acknowledge that it can be very difficult to coordinate amongst mission and non-mission partners with different agendas and mandates.

3. MAIN UNITED NATIONS BODIES INVOLVED IN PEACEKEEPING



Slide 6


4. STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS



Slide 7

- 🗨 In the UN system and for the purposes of this training, we are using the following meanings for the words:

- **Strategic:** The high level political decision-making (UN Security Council) and management (UN DPKO) of a UN peacekeeping operation at UN HQ.
- **Operational:** The field-level management of a peacekeeping operation at the Mission Headquarters is considered to be the operational level. This is the level at which strategic level objectives are translated into plans that prioritize and maximize the use of scarce resources.
- **Tactical:** The day-to-day management of military, police and civilian operations below the level of Mission Headquarters as well as the supervision of individual personnel is considered to be at the tactical level.



Slide 8

- Slide 9 depicts the idea of the necessary translation of the mandated strategic objective of protection of civilians into operational priorities.
- Protection efforts tend to be expressed in purely *tactical* terms (e.g. patrols, checkpoints, defensive cordons.)
- Operational level planning is the critical link which organizes tactical activities and scarce resource into a coherent, proactive plan which allows the strategic objective (protection of civilians) to be broken down into operational priorities.

- 🗨️ Planning requires the analysis of available resources and existing threats. Consultation with mission and mission partners is an essential element of planning (PKO, UNCT, NGOs, Host Government etc).
- 🗨️ Protection strategies should include steps to prevent and pre-empt violence, as well as planning for crisis response—that is, a plan to predict and deal with escalations of violence.

👉 **Notes to Instructor:** Remark that clear “command and control” only exists within the mission structure. Coordination with non-mission partners occurs through liaison and consultation.

👉 The engagement of Mission leadership in the development and implementation of POC is absolutely essential to success.

5. TEMPLATE FOR COMPREHENSIVE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS STRATEGIES

POC and Mission Planning

- The tool to be used: **Template for Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies.**

Template

- POC risks
- Activities to be undertaken
- Resources and capabilities
- Protection actors
- Roles and responsibilities
- Coordination
- Monitoring and reporting
- Lessons learned

Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Operations

1. Purpose of the Framework and POC Strategy

1. The Framework provides the guidance and the coordination for drafting comprehensive protection of civilians (POC) strategies, which are essential for ensuring the safety and effective implementation of POC in UN operations. The Framework is intended to assist UN operations in the design, development and implementation of POC strategies. It is intended to be used as a guide for the development of POC strategies and to ensure that they are consistent with the principles and standards of POC. The Framework also provides guidance on the coordination and implementation of POC strategies and on the roles and responsibilities of the various actors involved in the process. The Framework is intended to be used as a guide for the development of POC strategies and to ensure that they are consistent with the principles and standards of POC.

• Identify actual and potential POC risks in the current area.

• Develop activities to be undertaken in the current context, or in consultation with other protection actors, to address these risks.

• Review the current and potential resources available to the UN operation.

• Develop an overview of the protection areas, including the legal framework, as well as plans to fulfill responsibilities to protection actors, and the capacity of the local protection system.

• Clarify roles and responsibilities within the mission and with its partners.

• Develop POC coordination mechanisms within the mission and with partners.

DPKO

Slide 9

- 🗨️ The Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategy is the framework which;
 - Establishes protection priorities and operational POC objectives

- Explains how protection considerations will be mainstreamed into the wider mission activities and tasks;
- Clarifies roles and responsibilities of the protection actors within the mission, within the wider UN “family” (UN agencies organizations and funds) and the wider protection community to maximize impact and avoid duplication.

🗨️ The (Draft) *Framework for Drafting Mission-wide Protection of Civilian Strategies in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations* is a tool designed to guide the development of the Mission Wide Strategy on POC.

6. EXPECTATION MANAGEMENT

Expectation Management

Lack of Protection for Civilians Under Attack in Northeast Congo

Uganda: No End to LRA Killings And Abductions

UN admits peacekeepers failed in Sudan clashes

UN protection of civilians under scrutiny after Libya, Ivory Coast

DPKO

Slide 11

- 🗨️ Ensuring that all stakeholders, particularly the local community, are aware of the mission’s POC mandate and its capacity to implement that mandate is critical. **Local population must know what peacekeepers can do to protect them.**
- 🗨️ The mission must also clearly communicate its mandate, capabilities and achievements to host authorities and other key stakeholders.

- Senior mission leadership must recognize that a pro-active and ongoing expectations management effort requires resource – both human and material – in order to be implemented.

Note to instructor: The headlines on slide 11 reflect the importance of POC for the international community and international public opinion. Explain how different actors see the role of an UN PKO concerning protection of civilians.






Expectation management

- Can the Field Mission protect everyone, anytime and everywhere?
- Perception is everything in UN PKO
- Expectations: the local population and the international community
- The need of a public information strategy


International community
Population
Host Government
Partners in the field

Slide 12

- Managing expectations is a mission crucial activity, affecting a mission’s credibility and legitimacy.**
 - At UNHQ:** SRSG briefing and reports to the UNSC, meetings with main TCCs, PCCs and donors, media conferences etc;
 - At Mission Level:** public information campaigns designed to target the different audiences and stakeholders, media conferences, meetings and briefings with neighbouring countries, meetings and briefings with host countries authorities and civil society representatives, etc.
- Public information campaigns, and other communications tactics – such as Community Liaison Assistants and Joint Protection Team outreach efforts should be established to ensure **reliable communication and constant interaction with the local population.**

-  **Notes to Instructor:** *It is critical that local communities understand clearly what peacekeepers can not do for them in case of attack. If civilians expect that peacekeepers are coming to help them, they may not take steps that they would otherwise take to protect themselves. (See section on “Assessing Vulnerabilities/Self-Sufficiency” below.)*
-  *Localized protection plans which include discussions with local people, and which lay out clearly what the peacekeepers are ABLE to in particular scenarios, what they can NOT do, and what the local community members plan to do (e.g. locals might say that they will flee to the peacekeeping base, etc.) ensures that there is no misunderstanding in case violence erupts.*
-  *By discussing mission activities and priorities peacekeepers can counter the manipulation of public opinion by armed or political actors and manage the assumptions and consent of host government, local communities and civil society, as well as partners in the field – NGOs, UNCT etc.)*
-  *It is also important to manage the expectations and perceptions of the international community, including UN member states.*
-  *Senior Mission Leadership must identify ways to communicate mission successes, as well as changes in the nature and scale of protection risks, resource needs, and strategies for adaptation and improvement to donor countries, advocacy organizations, and the international media.*

7. INFORMATION GATHERING AND ANALYSIS








Slide 14


- Ensure that community members have access to the peacekeepers to report information and raise alarms. In particular, keep in mind the need for female officers, interpreters, police and Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs). Ensure that the physical location of offices and the security around offices and bases is not a barrier to good communication.
- Establish reliable, ongoing means of communication – such as call centers – as well as regular community meetings and meetings with women’s organizations, targeted interviews, and regular day-to-day conversations when peacekeepers are on patrol.
- Management of the risk to external actors providing intelligence, including information management practices ensuring confidentiality when requested or needed, is essential in order to maintain the trust and cooperation of non- mission actors. **Mechanisms and opportunities for engagement with civilian actors should be designed to minimize the risk for these organizations and the populations they serve.**
- Information needs to go up and down the mission chain of command, horizontally, to all aspects of the mission, and also out laterally to non-mission partners. **Information must be shared in a timely and consistent way.** This improves coordination and ensures that mission components operating at the field level have all the necessary

information to make decisions including in emergency situations without the constant need to consult with HQ.

- It is important to ensure strong collaboration with the child protection monitoring and reporting mechanism, as well as the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangement for conflict related sexual violence.

-  **Notes to Instructor:** *reference the Henry L Stimson Center, Forthcoming Publication– Military Planning to Protect Civilians p.68-72 and OCHA / DPKO Study, p. 194-1999.*
-  **Community Liaison Assistants** *are locally recruited staff with ties in the area that peacekeepers are operating in. CLI can act as both interpreters and liaisons between the local community and the mission, facilitating meaningful, ongoing communication, building trust and improving the mission’s overall situational awareness and local historical and cultural understanding.*
-  *Brief quickly on the JOC and JMAC structures and how the missions and mission partner elements are represented there. Explain the flow of information between tactical to operational level including the activities of collecting, sharing and analyzing - production of intelligence.*
-  *Comment on the need of having enhanced mechanisms for information gathering. The need of having people with training and ability to participate in a collection plan. The local population is the most important source of information with regards to the protection of civilians. The mission should work with community representatives, including refugee or IDP representatives, and establish channels of communication open to all civilians in the area of operations.*
-  *Humanitarian protection actors often have useful information and analysis which can contribute to the peacekeeping operation’s efforts to protect civilians.*

8. ANALYZING PROTECTION THREATS, VULNERABILITIES AND THE RISK OF ATTACK



Slide 15

Overall POC Risk:

- Taking into consideration the calculation of THREAT and VULNERABILITY as explained above, the overall POC risk is determined by considering the level of THREAT relative to the VULNERABILITY of the civilian population. It is important also to note that **the risk of attack increases the longer the threat is allowed to exist.**

• **OVERALL POC RISK = THREAT X VULNERABILITY**

Threat Assessment:

Threat Assessment

Threat = Capacity x Intent x Opportunity

1. What is the motivation for the violence?
2. Is the perpetration of violence against civilians essential to the *survival* of the belligerent group?
3. What does the *motive* for violence against civilians tell us about the necessary *protection response* to each given belligerent group?



Slide 16

- 💡 Consideration of the history, motivation, and capabilities of the negative forces, as well as the group's logic for harming civilians and the relationship between that logic and the overall aim of the group.

💡 **THREAT = CAPACITY X OPORTUNITY**

👉 **Notes to Instructor: Threat Assessment** - A threat *CONTINUES* to be a threat until it is determined (through reliable intelligence and analysis) that the belligerent in question no longer has the *MEANS*, or the *INTENT* to carry out the threat.

👉 Refer to descriptions of motivation for violence in **Module 1**.

- 💡 **What is the motivation for the violence?** (e.g. is violence indiscriminate and aimed primarily at “soft”, easily attacked targets, or is it targeted at specific groups or individuals for political or military strategic reasons? Etc).
- 💡 **Is the perpetration of violence against civilians essential to the *survival* of the belligerent group?** (e.g. Is violence mainly perpetrated for looting and re-supplying

belligerents, for the purpose of forced recruitment or forced labor? Is it necessary to the *political* or *military* survival of the group?)

- What does the *motive* for violence against civilians tell us about the necessary **protection response to each given belligerent group?** (e.g. If violence is strategically used against specific communities then a deterrent posture might be effective, but if violence is opportunistic, then effective deterrence would require “a peacekeeper in every village and behind every tree” and is not practical. In this case it might be necessary to employ a more proactive posture designed to seize the initiative from belligerent forces.) **Note that violence against civilians is never justified, regardless of the motive.**



Example: Massacre in the Makombo Area

(The following are excerpts from Human Rights Watch Report “Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in Northeastern Congo”, 2010)

*From December 14 to 17, 2009, the LRA carried out one of the most devastating single attacks in the group’s sordid history. During a **four-day operation** in northern Congo—the Makombo area and its surroundings, in Niangara Territory, Haut Uele district, near the Sudan border—the LRA killed at least 321 civilians and abducted more than 250 others, including at least 80 children.. Bodies were later found by family members and local authorities all along the 105-kilometer round journey made by the LRA through the Makombo area and toward the small town of Tapili. LRA combatants attacked a succession of villages and towns, each time posing as Ugandan or Congolese army soldiers first, then killing and looting, before taking with them large numbers of abductees tied together. **The tactics used by the LRA during the Makombo operation indicate that their purpose was to kill, abduct, and pillage.***

The operation may in part have been to re-supply the group with new recruits and essential supplies, such as salt, sugar, batteries, and clothes. LRA combatants

specifically searched out areas where people might gather—such as markets, churches, and water points—and repeatedly asked those they encountered about the location of schools, indicating that one of their objectives was to abduct children. Then the LRA forced their captives to march off with them.

Only by late December 2009, did MONUC officials begin to receive information about a possible large-scale LRA attack around Makombo. *MONUC officials told Human Rights Watch (an international NGO that monitors human rights abuses) the information was initially sketchy and unconfirmed, but no immediate efforts were made to follow-up, even though one of the reports received by MONUC indicated that over 100 civilians had been killed. One possible explanation for the lack of response was that MONUC’s focus remained on the Kivu provinces and the rumored LRA attacks on Dungu and other towns for which troops has been put on high alert.*


On December 23, 2009, the Security Council passed Resolution 1906 calling on “the governments of the Great Lakes region to coordinate their efforts to address the threat posed by the LRA” and strongly encouraging “enhanced regular information-sharing...with MONUC and other United Nations Missions in the areas where the LRA is threatening the population.”

Assessing Vulnerabilities:

Analyzing Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability = individual/community factors x (environmental factors / access to assistance)

- ❑ Who are the civilians to be protected? (refugees, IDPs, children, gender based group, ethnic or religious groups? ...)
- ❑ What are the environmental aspects to be considered? (geographic location, level of state authority in the area, infrastructures ...)
- ❑ What are the conditions of access to assistance? (ability to access assistance, language barriers, freedom of movement ...)



Slide 17

- 🗨️ Vulnerabilities are based on the characteristics of the civilians (individual and community factors) and the factors that can lead to and compound those vulnerabilities (environmental factors.)

🗨️ **VULNERABILITY = (INDIVIDUAL OR COMMUNITY FACTORS) X (ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS) / (ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE)**

- 🗨️ **Individual or Community Factors:** Age, gender, sex, ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, social status (both rank and different social powers and freedoms e.g. between men and women).
- 🗨️ **Environmental factors (of the civilians):** Status as an internally displaced person or a refugee increases vulnerability. Also, environmental factors such as geographic location (both a logistical consideration, and a tactical one – e.g. are you cordoning off and defending an IDP site, holding a town, or protecting civilians in a more diffused area – and what are the different postures required for each), level of urbanization, level of state authority and capacity in that area, level of infrastructures (e.g. roads) and communication (e.g. phone network) etc.
- 🗨️ **Access to Assistance:** Consider the ability of individuals, families and communities to access assistance and interact with outsiders/institutions – consider language barriers,

relative freedom of movement, possible social or political barriers to communication with outsiders, etc. (e.g. would vulnerable women - whether in powerful or marginalized families – be able to seek assistance themselves, or would social norms or structures be a barrier to communication with peacekeepers?) ... devise assessment (and communication...see Module 4, section 4) strategies to overcome these barriers.

- 🗨️ **Self-Sufficiency:** Many communities have developed self-protection strategies, including early-warning capacities, self-defence capacities, or even strategies as simple as flight when an attack is detected. UN protection assessments and plans should take into account the self-protection strategies and capacities of local communities and seek to support those to the extent possible.

👉 **Notes to Instructor:** Refer to the *DPKO/DFS Guidelines for Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations*.

👉 Refer to children – both boys and girls- as a specific subset of civilians that are particularly vulnerable in times of war. Children face unique threats and protection risks (such as heightened threat of recruitment, abduction and sexual abuse.)

👉 Remark on the differences in the broad category of civilians (example: the needs of civilians in villages or IDP sites in Haiti are very different from the needs of civilians in villages of IDP sites in South Sudan etc).


👉 “Self-Defence” forces have, in some cases, morphed into negative armed actors in their own right. These should be approached with extreme caution.



Example:

In DR Congo the MONUSCO Joint Protection Teams have built upon local protection strategies to maximize the overall protection response in remote communities, and to stretch scarce mission resources more effectively.


9. PRIORITIZING RISKS AND ALLOCATING RESOURCES



Slide 18

Prioritizing Risks and Allocating Resources

- ❑ POC risks must be prioritized in terms of the relative probability of attack and the relative impact.
- ❑ Most likely scenario and the worst case scenario (gravity and likelihood).
- ❑ Gaps in the mission protection capabilities (minimized and informed).


Slide 19

- 🗨️ **POC risks must be prioritized** by taking into consideration the relative **PROBABILITY** of attack (based on existing human rights reporting, intelligence and historical analysis) as well as the relative **IMPACT** that the mission can have on each given risk. (e.g. the Protection Clusters in DRC allocated mission POC resources by designating “Must Protect,” “Should Protect,” and “Could Protect” areas based on ongoing analysis of available resources and protection risks).
- 🗨️ **Good planning should incorporate civilian, police and military resources, allows a multidimensional response**, and should focus on the most **LIKELY** scenario, and the **WORST CASE** scenario, based on the analysis of risk, probability and impact.
- 🗨️ Planning processes should **take due consideration of the host Government’s willingness and ability to protect civilians** in the face of the most likely and worst case scenarios as identified.
- 🗨️ Where GAPS in the mission’s protection capabilities are identified, you should;


At Mission Level:


- Reprioritize objectives/activities;
- Engage external protection actors to identify possible ways to fill protection gaps

- Redeploy resources and staff as required (e.g. to areas at risk);

At NYHQ level:

- Inform the Security Council and the 5th Committee of the General Assembly about the identified gaps
- Discuss with Troop and Police Contributing Countries the possible removal of national caveats and/or inquire whether contributing countries can contribute additional resources,
- Mobilize new resources through trust funds or groups of friends;

 **Notes to Instructor:** *It is important to balance the distribution of resources in order to develop/maintain the ability to prevent/deter violence, respond quickly to rapid onset crises, and implement proactive “operations” which “seize the initiative” (influence/compel) from negative forces.*

 **The multidimensional response** *is reflected in the components` individual work plans. The articulation of roles and responsibilities shall be consistent with those spelled out in Mission-Wide Protection of Civilians Strategy. (That, in turn, shall be consistent with the ISF.)*



Example:

*The DSRSG-RoL in MONUSCO, for example, has established an **Early Warning and Rapid Response Cell**, a forum that brings together the full spectrum of protection actors inside MONUSCO, including the military component, police, the human rights division, civil affairs, child protection, and the Joint Mission Analysis Cell. The MONUSCO public information office is also present to help with any needs to communicate on the protection mandates and activities. The cell meets regularly and reports to the Senior Management Group, providing both updates on emerging threats and suggestions for possible action.*

10. REDUCING THREAT AND VULNERABILITY

Reducing Threat and Vulnerability


- Reducing **vulnerability** = actions affecting the targeted population
- Reducing **threat** = actions affecting the perpetrators


Protect IDP camp	Patrolling and Checkpoints	Facilitate humanitarian assistance /
HR monitoring	Establish safe zones	CLA
Self-protection arrangements	Public information actions	Joint protection teams
Offensive operations	Robust patrolling / night patrolling	Seizing of belligerent ground / area domination
Public information	Sanctions / freezing funds	Political action
Capture of militia leaders	COBs / TOBs	Control key infrastructure

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
- To effectively protect civilians, peacekeepers must **reduce the vulnerability of civilians** on the one hand, and the **threat of attack** on the other.
 - **Reducing the vulnerability** of civilians involves actions focused on the targeted population, rather than the belligerent, and seeking to reduce the exposure of civilians to attack. These can take the form of:
 - Defensive and stabilizing operations (e.g. deterrent positions and cordons; checkpoints; patrols);
 - Facilitating humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring; and
 - Public information efforts to inform civilians about protection risks.
 - **Reducing the threat** to civilians entails taking steps to change the behaviour of belligerents and may involve reducing their offensive capabilities.
 - With external POC actors— UN and independent actors.
 - With host authorities.
 - With local communities
- 👉 **Notes for Instructor: Joint Protection Teams (JPTs)** are designed to help military outposts—Company Operating Bases—to better understand the

socio-political context around them and the threats to civilians. Composed of staff from the offices of Civil Affairs, human rights, political affairs, child protection, public information and sometimes the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) Section (as well as humanitarian agency staff), they are deployed on a temporary basis not only to provide information gathering and analytical support, but also to help design context-specific civil and military measures to protect civilians and liaise with local authorities. Civil Affairs plays a key role in organizing JPTs and in drafting 'protection planning' matrices with other protection partners to assist prioritize the military activities related to POC. The JPTs and joint planning matrices follow on from an established pattern in MONUC of civil–military cooperation and a 'joint protection' concept in operation since at least 2006.

 There are other **patrolling techniques** (beyond the firewood patrols) to help protect civilians in areas where they may be exposed to threats. Many missions undertake similar protective activities for example in ensuring that regular patrols route through locations such as rivers where women or children wash clothes, or locations where civilians travel to collect water; or to and from markets and where crops are tended, Such patrolling decisions have been improved in missions such as MONUSCO where JPTs have allowed for greater information sharing and planning around vulnerability and threat assessments.

 Improving the **capability of UN peacekeeping operations to operate at night** can be a major factor in improving civilian security.


11. KEY QUESTIONS TO ASK WHEN PLANNING



Key Questions to Ask When Planning

- ❑ How many civilians are threatened and how severe is the threat?
- ❑ Who is the source of the threat, and what is their relationship to the host nation and the issue of strategic consent?
- ❑ What are the most dangerous consequences of inaction for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- ❑ What are the most likely consequences of inaction for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- ❑ Does the UN PKO have the capacity to address the threat in whole or part?

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Key Questions Continued...

- ❑ What are the possible courses of action available to the UN to effectively address the threat?
- ❑ For each course of action, what are the most dangerous consequences for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- ❑ For each course of action, what are the most likely consequences for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- ❑ For those courses of action deemed potentially most effective at addressing the threat, how can consequences be mitigated/managed?

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- How many civilians are threatened and how severe is the threat?
- Who is the source of the threat, and what is their relationship to the host nation and the issue of strategic consent?
- What are the most dangerous consequences of inaction for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- What are the most likely consequences of inaction for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?

- Does the UN PKO have the capacity to address the threat in whole or part?
- What are the possible courses of action available to the UN to effectively address the threat? For each course of action, what are the most dangerous consequences for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- For each course of action, what are the most likely consequences for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- For those courses of action deemed potentially most effective at addressing the threat, how can consequences be mitigated/managed?



Notes for Instructor: comment on the threat-oriented questions, the related mission capabilities and possible course of actions.



Learning Activity 4.1

Developing a Mission Wide POC Strategy



Learning Activity Time Required:

30 minutes for small group discussion and preparation of POC strategy

15 minutes for presentation of the strategy (responses to the questions)

Total time: **45 minutes**

Activity Guidelines:

1. Divide participants into groups of 6 or less. If possible, include military, civilian and police participants in each group. If the participants are all from one community


(e.g. all police) then refer to **Annex D** and assign each participant a role to play while carrying out the planning exercise.

- Distribute the Activity Handout (**Annex E**) and a planning Matrix (**Annex F**) to each group. Using the “Key Questions to Ask When Planning” as guides, and using the Carana material (provided) as their case study, ask the participants to answer the following:


Tasks:



- Describe what obligations UNAC has to the civilian population in Carana, and why; (Refer to the sample Carana Mandate for UNAC mandated protection roles.);
- Based on the Carana case study information (background, threat assessment, etc.) identify Key Protection Risks (Threats and Vulnerabilities) facing civilians (or groups of civilians) in Carana.
 - Consider threats posed by armed groups, threats posed by social conditions, and threats posed by political instability, etc.
 - Consider what motivates the armed actors (what do they WANT and therefore what are they likely to DO), who are they most likely to harm, and what means do they have to perpetrate harm?
- Identify what UNAC can do to reduce the number of threats and the levels of vulnerability;
 - What factors (or likely changes in the situation on the ground) might affect their level of vulnerability? How (through what steps or activities) could their vulnerabilities be reduced? Etc.
 - Focus on OPERATIONAL level actions (e.g. the operational task “deploy troops to establish broad area security in sector X” as opposed to the related tactical level task “deploy foot patrols and roadblocks in areas Y and Z”) What factors (or likely changes in the situation on the ground) might affect their level of vulnerability? How (through what steps or activities) could their vulnerabilities be reduced? Etc.

- Fill in the “Implementation Matrix” (Annex F) with the Risks, Activities/Mitigating Measures (Operational level) and the lead and supporting actors (within the mission and including partner organizations).
 - Ask one or two groups to present their plans, and ask the rest of the groups to comment on those plans and add additional ideas and criticisms.
 - Press participants to prioritize preventive and pre-emptive perspective (reduction of vulnerabilities), as opposed to a reactive perspective.
 - Emphasize at the end of the discussion period that **protection plans are living documents that need to be reviewed and adapted on an ongoing basis in order to address changes mission realities**. Use this point to transition to the scenario based exercises

 *Emphasize at the end of the discussion period that **protection plans are living documents that need to be reviewed and adapted on an ongoing basis in order to address changes mission realities**. Use this point to transition to the scenario based exercises.*

12. SUMMARY OF KEY MESSAGES

 **Note to Instructor:** *Outline the main points that have been covered during the session.*

-  Operational planning is the tool used at mission level which permits the organization of available resources within the mission as well as the coordination of those existing outside the mission in a coherent plan to address strategic goal of protecting civilians.
-  Planning requires the analysis of available resources and existing threats. Consultation with mission and non-mission partners, and specifically local communities, is an essential.

- 🔑 The *Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategy* lays out how protection considerations will be mainstreamed into the wider mission activities and tasks and clarifies roles and responsibilities of the protection actors within the mission, within the wider UN family, and the wider protection community to maximize impact and avoid duplication.
- 🔑 It is essential that all stakeholders, particularly the local community, are aware of the mission's POC mandate and its relative capacity to implement that mandate. Local population must know what peacekeepers can (and what they can-not) do in terms of protection.
- 🔑 Expectation management is a mission-critical activity.
- 🔑 Information must be shared within the mission and with partners in a timely and consistent way. This improves coordination and ensures that mission components operating at the field level have all the necessary information to make decisions.
- 🔑 The overall **POC RISK** is determined by considering the level of **THREAT** relative to the **VULNERABILITY** of the civilian population.
- 🔑 To assess the level of **THREAT**, take into consideration of the history, motivation, and capabilities of the negative forces, as well as the group's logic for harming civilians and the relationship between that logic, and the overall aim of the group.
- 🔑 To assess the level of **VULNERABILITY** consider the characteristics of the civilians (individual and community factors) and the factors that can lead to and compound those vulnerabilities (environmental factors.)
- 🔑 POC risks must be prioritized by taking into consideration the relative **PROBABILITY** of attack (based on existing human rights reporting, intelligence and historical analysis) as well as the relative **IMPACT** that the mission can have on each given risk.
 - Reducing the vulnerability of civilians involves actions focused on the targeted population, rather than the belligerent, and seeking to reduce the exposure of civilians to attack.

- Reducing the threat to civilians entails taking steps to change the behavior of belligerents and may involve reducing their offensive capabilities.
- Protection is a tremendous strategic objective, translated in multiple operational and tactical tasks.



Learning Activity 4.1: Group Discussion on POC strategy


ANNEX D

ASSIGNING ROLES

At the discretion of the instructor, and depending on the composition of the group, the instructor may choose to assign “roles” for the participants to play while engaging in the group discussions. This should be considered when the group does not include participants from each of the civilian, police and military areas of the mission.

Suggested roles are as follows;

ROLES/RESPONSIBILITIES

 **Note to Instructor:** *The following descriptions were drawn largely from the Mission Start-up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2008) with the exception of the write up on the Head of the Human Rights Component, which was contributed by OHCHR.*

Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General: Humanitarian Coordinator/Regional Coordinator (DSRSG HC/RC):

In integrated missions, one DSRSG will be appointed as a “triple-hatted” RC, HC and DSRSG simultaneously. This DSRSG/RC/HC function provides a bridge or primary point of contact and coordination between the mission and UNCT, in addition to substantive managerial roles. DSRSG/RC/HC may be responsible for a mission pillar. This pillar often includes advisory or programmatic roles that most closely relate to the ongoing work of UNCT and may include rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); humanitarian coordination, etc.

In the RC capacity, DSRSG/RC/HC is responsible for coordinating UNCT and United Nations development plans and operations. As the UNCT is vital in planning and implementing the mission's POC strategy, the RC plays an important role in convening consultations and coordinating inputs. She/he may also be responsible for donor coordination in recovery and development and for maintaining links with governments, donors and other development partners. DSRSG/RC/HC retains a secondary technical reporting line to the UNDP Administrator, as Chair of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG).

In the HC capacity, DSRSG/RC/HC is responsible for coordinating humanitarian plans and operations and for maintaining links with governments (and other parties), donors and the broader humanitarian community. When it comes to ensuring humanitarian access to vulnerable populations and the protection of civilian humanitarian personnel, she/he is an important link between the mission and the humanitarian community, though care must be taken so as not to blur the roles. She/he retains a secondary reporting line to the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). Where HC is supported by OCHA, it will serve as the humanitarian coordination office. Where appropriate, OCHA may be located separately from the mission to facilitate access by the broader humanitarian community.

Head of Military Component (Force Commander):

The primary function of the military component in United Nations missions is to provide a secure environment as a precondition for moving ahead on other elements of peace agreements. SRSG/HOM military component is normally a Force Component (FC) or, in missions with only unarmed observers, the Chief Military Observer. HOMC provides leadership and has specified responsibilities for all military personnel and units assigned to the mission.

During mission start-up, and as part of MLT, HOMC helps SRSG/HOM and other senior mission leaders develop an integrated approach to implementing the mission mandate. Specifically, HOMC develops and oversees the implementation of the military CONOPS.

HOMC also plans for and oversees the deployment, security, support and other operational activities of the military component, and prepares them to conduct operations to support the mission mandate.

The HOMC plays a critical role in setting the tone for how the mission's military component will act to protect civilians. She/he can help to create an environment in which peacekeeping forces are empowered with the flexibility to respond quickly to POC risks and he/she is personally involved in approving strategic operations, troop deployments and the distribution of military facilities. The HOMC has responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of the rules of engagement; however, the HOMC cannot change the rules of engagement.

Police Commander:

The police component is generally established as a separate component within a mission with a single chain of command and with all personnel accountable to and under the operational control of a Police Commissioner (PC). The PC, sometimes known as a Senior Police Adviser (SPA), usually reports to SRSG/HOM through a designated DSRSG. The PC is a member of MLT and ensures that all relevant police plans are coordinated to support the overall management of the mission and to advance the United Nations Mission Plan.

During the start-up phase, the Office of the PC (O/PC) plans and budgets for the police component in line with the mission plan, ensuring that policy, administrative, logistical and communications support is adequate. O/PC establishes the police headquarters (PHQ), which should be fully integrated within MHQ. With DSRSG and DMS/CMS, O/PC decides on the locations of subordinate PHQs and team sites in the field. PC and O/PC designated staff also regularly work with the Police Division in DPKO/DFS on all aspects of mandate implementation. This includes developing and implementing police policies, guidelines, directives and planning tools, and recruiting and selecting international police personnel. The deployment of these personnel is managed through the Police Division with Member States and implemented via DPKO/DFS.

Chief of Political Affairs Section:

The Political Affairs Office (PAO) provides early assessments and situational awareness of the mission's political environment to SRSG/HOM and MLT/SMG. It also makes recommendations on the design and implementation of the political elements of the United Nations Mission Plan. PAO should be established as soon as possible to undertake detailed political analysis and planning. The role of the PAO is critical in the start-up phase of a peacekeeping operation if a finalized peace agreement is not in place or if a long-term political transition is under way.

As the mission's principle internal reporting body the Political Affairs Section is critical to ensuring the information from the field is gathered and analyzed from a POC point of view and delivered in an efficient and effective manner to senior mission leadership. It is vital that Political Affairs personnel have an in-depth understanding of the political and security environment in which day-to-day developments are taking place so that they may accurately identify trends and risks.

When responding to a POC risk, the Political Affairs Section provides support to the efforts by the mission leadership to preempt threats to civilians through political dialogue. Over the longer term, the Section will also advise mission leadership on ways in which a protective environment can be fostered.

Chief of Civil Affairs Section:

Civil Affairs components are a flexible resource within United Nations peacekeeping missions, operating under the overall guidance of SRSG/HOM. They can perform a variety of different functions, primarily at the local level, in support of overall mission operations. In most cases, the main role of Civil Affairs components, particularly early in deployment, is civilian liaison with local state and non-state actors on the full range of mission activities and local concerns. They also do local-level monitoring and/or coordination work. Depending on the mandate and identified needs, Civil Affairs components can also carry out — in parallel or

in succession during the course of the mission — non-technical support to the restoration of state authority and local-level conflict management and confidence-building (including QIPs). These roles are identified in advance through IMPP and depend to a certain extent on the capacities and activities of other actors (particularly UNCT). In view of the wide range of possible activities that can be carried out in support of Civil Affairs roles in a given context, the Head of Civil Affairs has an important function in selecting appropriate activities for Civil Affairs Officers.

The Civil Affairs Section often takes the lead in rolling out a protection of civilians mandate on behalf of mission leadership. As the key interlocutor at the technical level between the mission and humanitarian actors, the Civil Affairs Section takes part in meetings of the Protection Cluster and may convene POC coordination meetings within the mission as well. The Civil Affairs Section is the local interlocutor at the local/community level. Civil Affairs Staff, especially host country nationals, are deployed to the deep field and provide vital information on micro political dynamics and potential POC risks. Therefore, if a POC risk is identified at this level, the Civil Affairs Section may take on this role instead of the Political Affairs Section. Its access to the field also makes Civil Affairs well placed to implement early warning and conflict mitigation systems.

Chief of Human Rights Component:

In many cases, it is the visibility of human rights and humanitarian aspects of crises that prompts the deployment of peace operations. There are therefore high expectations that with a UN intervention, human rights issues will be high on the agenda. The presence of a human rights component is key to establish credibility in the eyes of the local population right from the start. Human rights officers benefit from widespread field presence and can operate through mobile teams in remote areas and are among those in the mission who have the most outreaching contacts with the local population. Human rights components lead or participate in the Protection Clusters at national level and they have specialist expertise to perform a wide range of functions, including but not limited to:

- Human rights monitoring and investigations
- Assessment (analysis and evaluation of causes of human rights violations and design of strategies)
- Reporting (internal and public)
- Advocacy and Intervention (this may range from quiet diplomacy to public statement and occur at local, national and international levels)
- Human Rights Advice, Support for Institutional Reform and Capacity Building (e.g. work alongside host governments to strengthen their capacity to promote and protect human rights or address past abuses and fight impunity)
- Advice and Assistance to other Components (e.g. how to address human rights issues that may arise in complex political and peace processes or early warning and advice on action to prevent violations)

For the last two decades, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – which is part of the UN Secretariat - has opted for integration of human rights components in peace operations instead of establishing separate OHCHR field offices, in countries where the Security Council decides to deploy such missions. The head of the human rights component, who is the representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and member of the UNCT and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), is normally a direct advisor to the Head of Mission and has dual reporting channels to both him/her (or through DSRSG) and the Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights (O/HCHR) in Geneva.



Learning Activity 4.1: Group Discussion on POC strategy

ANNEX E

PARTICIPANT HANDOUT (2 PAGES)

KEY QUESTIONS TO ASK WHEN PLANNING

- How many civilians are threatened and how severe is the threat?
- Who is the source of the threat, and what is their relationship to the host nation and the issue of strategic consent?
- What are the most dangerous consequences of inaction for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- What are the most likely consequences of inaction for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- Does the UN PKO have the capacity to address the threat in whole or part?
- What are the possible courses of action available to the UN to effectively address the threat? For each course of action, what are the most dangerous consequences for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- For each course of action, what are the most likely consequences for civilians, the peace/stabilization process, and the mission?
- For those courses of action deemed potentially most effective at addressing the threat, how can consequences be mitigated/managed?

Instruction:

Using the “Key Questions to Ask When Planning” (box above) as guides, and using the Carana material (provided) answer the following questions

1. Describe the obligations that UNAC has to the civilian population in Carana, and why; (Refer to the sample Carana mandate for UNAC mandated protection roles.)

2. Based on the Carana case study information (background, threat assessment, etc.) Identify Key Protection Risks (Threats and Vulnerabilities) facing civilians (or groups of civilians) in Carana.

- Consider threats posed by armed groups, threats posed by social conditions, and threats posed by political instability, etc.
- Consider what motivates the armed actors (what do they WANT and therefore what are they likely to DO), who are they most likely to harm, and what means do they have to perpetrate harm?

3. Identify what UNAC can do to reduce the number of threats and the levels of vulnerability

- What factors (or likely changes in the situation on the ground) might affect their level of vulnerability? How (through what steps or activities) could their vulnerabilities be reduced? Etc.
- Focus on OPERATIONAL level actions (e.g. the operational task “deploy troops to establish broad area security in sector X” as opposed to the related tactical level task “deploy foot patrols and roadblocks in areas Y and Z”) What factors (or likely changes in the situation on the ground) might affect their level of vulnerability? How (through what steps or activities) could their vulnerabilities be reduced? Etc.

4. Fill in the “Implementation Matrix” (Annex F) with the Risks, Activities/Mitigating Measures (Operational level) and the lead and supporting actors (within the mission and including partner organizations).

- Ask one or two groups to present their plans, and ask the rest of the groups to comment on those plans and add additional ideas and criticisms.
- Press participants to prioritize preventive and pre-emptive perspective (reduction of vulnerabilities), as opposed to a reactive perspective.
- Emphasize that **protection plans are living documents that need to be reviewed and adapted on an ongoing basis in order to address changes mission realities**. Use this point to transition to the scenario based exercises.



Learning Activity 4.1: Group Discussion on POC strategy

ANNEX F
MATRIX FROM *FRAMEWORK FOR DRAFTING COMPREHENSIVE*

Protection of Civilians Risks to be Addressed (in order of priority)	Activities/Mitigating Measures	Lead Actor	Supporting Actors